I n eight v olu m es and a m illion w ords ,w e hav e narrated the dev elop m ent ofthe Sov iet econom y s ince 1 928 .The firs t ofthes e v olu m es w as the conclu ding ins talm ent ofthe H istoryofthe Bolshe vik Re volution,the great p roject b egu n b y E.H .Carr after the Second W orld W ar (Carr and Dav ies 1 969) .That v olu m e fix ed the s tarting p oint for the indu s trialis ation ofthe Sov iet Union,at that tim e a cou ntry ofthou s ands offactories and m ill ions offarm s ,b arely recov ered from s ev en y ears offoreign and civ ilw ar,its econom y s trained b etw een p lan and m arket,p u s hed and p u lled b y a au tocratic,m odernis ing regim e w ith s hal low roots and v au lting am b itions .
I n the p res ent s eries ,The Ind ustria lisa tionofSovie tRussia ,Volu m es 1 to 3 narrated the dram atic trans form ations that Stalin s et in m otion in 1 929 and 1 9 3 0:the collectiv is ation of25 m illion p eas ant farm s ,and the centraliz ation ofthe entire econom y u nder a hierarchy ofp lans and q u antitativ e controls . 1 Thes e changes w ere aim ed at s ecu ring the b as is of a v as t effort to indu s trialis e the cou ntry and m odernis e its econom ic and m ilitary p ow er.W hile great s tep s w ere now taken tow ards thes e goals , the im m ediate res u lt w as a cris is ofv as t dim ens ions that s p read acros s b oth tow n and cou ntry s ide.I n the contex t ofu nex p ected harv es t s hortfalls in 1 93 1 and 1 93 2,Stalin's p olicies b rou ght ab ou t a fam ine that carried aw ay u p to s ix m il lion liv es .The ev olu tion ofthe cris is w as recou nted in Volu m es 4 and 5 . 2 I n the m iddle y ears ofthe decade,that is ,from 1 93 4 to 1 9 3 6,the cris is receded.The harv es t retu rned to a m ore norm allev elin 1 93 3 ,and this w as fol low ed b y a m ore generalrecov ery .T he recov ery w as p rom oted b y a tu rn aw ay from the ex trem es of1 929 and 1 93 0 .T he m ore m oderate p olicies ofthe m id-1 93 0 s inclu ded greater toleration ofp riv ate farm ing and food m arkets ,the lim itation ofrep res s ion and v iolence directed at m anagers and indu s trials p ecialis ts ,and a m ore s tab le,p redictab le p olicy fram ew ork.This allow ed not only the recov ery ofagricu ltu re and food dis trib u tion b u t als o the b elated com p letion ofm any p rojects b egu n in earlier y ears .T here w as an u p s u rge ofindu s trialp rodu ction and p rodu ctiv ity .The p rogres s ofthis p eriod,des crib ed in Volu m e 6,w as rem arkab le. 3 On W es tern and p os t-Sov iet m eas u res ofthe Sov iet Union's real nationalincom e,b y 1 9 3 9 the aggregate realou tp u t ofthe Sov iet econom y w as tw ice that ofthe s am e territory in 1 91 3 .T he natu ralincreas e ofthe Sov iet p op u lation w ou ld no dou b t hav e b een s low ed ov er the s am e p eriod b y the decline offertility that norm ally accom p anies econom ic grow th, b u t w ars ,fam ine,and terror held it b ack additionally .By 1 9 3 9,real ou tp u t p er p ers on w as 60 p er cent greater than in 1 91 3 (T ab le 1 ).Bu t the com p aris on oftw o y ears s ep arated b y a q u arter centu ry does not rev eal the p attern ofgrow th,w hich w as ex trem ely u ns teady .The figu res for ou tp u t p er p ers on s how no grow th from 1 9 1 3 to 1 93 2 and alm os t no grow th from 1 93 7 to 1 93 9 .T he entire increas e ofou tp u t p er p ers on recorded b etw een 1 91 3 and 1 93 9 w as s q u eez ed into the fiv e y ears that b egan from the low p oint of1 93 2,after the failed harv es t ofthat y ear,and ended in 1 93 7 as the circle ofrep res s ions w idened.W ithou t thos e fiv e y ears ,there w ou ld hav e b een no grow th for a q u arter ofa centu ry .
I n 1 93 7 ,as narrated in the p res ent v olu m e,the u p s u rge w as s u ddenly halted,and p rogres s w as b arely res u m ed b y the ou tb reak ofthe Second W orld W ar.Certainly ,econom ic ex p ans ion cou ld not hav e b een s u s tained for long at the p ace ofthe m id-1 93 0 s .N ot only w as it v u lnerab le to the w eather,as the harv es t failu re of1 93 6 dem ons trated.I t w as now dis ru p ted b y the things that w e hav e des crib ed:terror,m as s killings ,and accelerated m ob iliz ation for w ar.
Ta b le 1 ne a rhe re .
W hat did it allm ean? This chap ter reflects on the w ider s ignificance of thes e ev ents .W e w illcons ider and b riefly ev alu ate the p attern ofSov iet indu s trialis ation,the m eas u res ofits p rogres s that w ere m ade av ail ab l e at the tim e and s u b s eq u ently ,the ex traordinary m ilitaris ation ofa m ob ilis ed s ociety and econom y ,the em ergence ofthe Sov iet Union as a glob al m ilitary p ow er,and the reform ab ility ofthe econom ic s y s tem that Stalin created.Conclu ding,w e w illas k w hat kind ofeconom ic dev elop m ent w as this .
(A )For ced i ndus tr i a l i s a ti on
I n the late nineteenth and early tw entieth centu ries ,the Ru s s ian Em p ire ex p erienced rap id indu s trialgrow th.For the q u arter-centu ry from 1 8 8 3 /8 7 to 1 90 9/1 3 ,indu s trialp rodu ction ex p anded at 4 . 5 p er cent annu ally ,com p ared w ith 3 . 3 p er cent for nationalincom e ov er the s am e p eriod (Gregory 1 98 2:1 3 3 ).Des p ite the p ace ofindu s trialex p ans ion,in 1 91 3 only 1 5 p ercent ofthe p op u lation ofthe Em p ire liv ed in tow ns (Rossiya 1 99 5:23 ) and les s than 9 p er cent ofthe w orking p op u lation (w ithin interw ar Sov iet frontiers ) w as em p loy ed in indu s try (Dav ies ,ed. , 1 99 0 :251 ).Thu s ,I m p erialRu s s ia's m arket econom y continu ed to retain a v ery large s hare oflab ou r res ou rces in agricu ltu re.A s ign of dis p rop ortion w as that v alu e added b y Ru s s ian indu s try in 1 91 3 , ex p res s ed as a s hare ofnationalincom e,w as 21 . 4 p er cent,m ore than tw ice indu s try 's em p loy m ent s hare (Gregory 1 9 8 2:7 3 ).Under the s tandard as s u m p tion ofdim inis hing retu rns to lab ou r,a cons iderab le gain cou ld hav e b een m ade b y accelerating the m ov em ent ofw orkers into indu s try ,b u t this gain w as not realis ed.
Sev eralhy p othes es hav e b een identified to accou nt for Ru s s ia's relativ ely low lev elofindu s trialis ation p rior to the Firs t W orld W ar. Alex ander Bay kov (1 95 4 ) argu ed that indu s trialis ation w as delay ed b y the dis tances s ep arating Ru s s ia's m ineralres ou rces from m arkets and lab ou r and b y p oor internalcom m u nications .According to Alex ander Gers chenkron (1 966) ,the rigidity ofru ralins titu tions s u ch as the p eas ant com m u ne endow ed p eas ants w ith inalienab le l and rights ,and w ith collectiv e res p ons ib ility for the ob ligations aris ing,and s o created an incentiv e to retain lab ou r in agricu ltu re. 4 Su b s eq u ent s cholars hip s u gges ted that the res trictions on p eas ant m ov em ent m ay not hav e b een as b inding as Gers chenkron s u p p os ed.Peas ants w ere m ore than cap ab le ofw orking arou nd the lim its ofthe law ,and w ere ab le to ex change land rights ,engage in b oth localand dis tant m arkets for hired lab ou r,and u ltim ately leav e the land altogether (Gregory 994 ):4 9-52;N afz iger 20 1 0 ). I t cou ld not b e as s u m ed,how ev er,that the p eas ants cou ld do thes e things freely or that the w orkarou nds did not com e at a cos t.
Other ev idence s u gges ts that agrarian m arkets w ere not fu lly efficient. The Stoly p in land reform s of1 9 0 6 w ere follow ed b y s harp increas es of b oth p eas ant m igration (Chernina et al.20 1 4 ) and agricu ltu ral p rodu ctiv ity (Cas tanẽda Dow er and M arkev ich 20 1 8 ) -ev idence that the s u p p lies ofb oth food and lab ou r from agricu ltu re w ere p rev iou s ly lim ited b y the com m u nalland tenu re that Stoly p in aim ed to u nderm ine.At the s am e tim e,the ex p erience ofthe Firs t W orld W ar indicates that,as lab ou r w as m ob iliz ed from agricu ltu re,p eas ants tended to reallocate effort in fav ou r ofland that w as held com m u nally ,des p ite its low er p rodu ctiv ity there,for the s ake ofthe as s ociated land rights and s ocialins u rance (Cas tanẽda Dow er and M arkev ich forthcom ing).For thes e reas ons it rem ains p lau s ib le to think ofRu s s ian agrarian ins titu tions as a b rake on indu s trialis ation.
Other lim itations on indu s trializ ation b efore the Rev olu tion hav e b een identified on the s ide ofindu s try .Variou s m echanis m s gav e incu m b ent firm s the p ow er to rais e p rofits b y res tricting ou tp u t and rais ing p rices , and als o b y res tricting em p loy m ent and redu cing w ages .Thes e inclu ded legalob s tacles to incorp oration (Gregg and N afz iger 20 1 6),the lack of legalob s tacles to the form ation ofcartels that res tricted com p etition at hom e (Kas er 1 97 8 ),and tariffb arriers that lim ited foreign com p etition (Kahan 1 967 ) Thes e findings s u gges t Ru s s ia's indu s trializ ation cou ld hav e b een accelerated b y p olicy reform s aim ed at b oth indu s try and agricu ltu re. Cons olidation ofthe Stoly p in land reform s cou ld hav e encou raged a land m arket and eas ier m igration from the cou ntry s ide.Legalreform s cou ld hav e giv en p riv ate b u s ines s es eas ier acces s to the b enefits of incorp oration,m aking the cap italm arket m ore com p etitiv e.I n p rodu ct m arkets ,a com p etition p olicy cou ld hav e dis cou raged collu s iv e p rices etting.The reform ofcom m ercialp olicy cou ld hav e lib eraliz ed foreign trade.W ith an eas ier s u p p ly oflab ou r,s u b ject to fiercer com p etition, Ru s s ia's indu s tries w ou ld hav e grow n m ore rap idly s til l,des p ite m aking low er p rofits ,and w ou ld hav e em p loy ed m ore w orkers ,des p ite p ay ing higher w ages .
I n the ou tcom e,the Sov iet econom y achiev ed its indu s trial b reakthrou gh b y other m eans .Allob s tacles to the s u p p ly oflab ou r to indu s try dis ap p eared in the early 1 93 0s ,w hen m il lions ofp eas ants w ere driv en from the cou ntry s ide b y fam ine.The m echanis m and the ex tent of its s u cces s w ere u nintended,and the fam ine w as accom p anied b y a retu rn to res trictions on agrarian lab ou r m ob ility .As for the ob s tacles on the s ide ofindu s try ,thes e too w ere ov ercom e b y com p u ls ion. The s tate im p os ed com p u ls ory q u otas on p rodu cers and ov errode cos t cons traints on ou tp u t b y gu aranteeing financiallos s es ,and the q u otas forced ou tp u t to higher lev els (as argu ed b y All en 20 0 3 :91 -94 ). I ndu s trialis ation w as v iolently accelerated.Betw een 1 928 and 1 9 4 0 ,the realgrow th ofSov iet civ ilian indu s try w as arou nd 1 0 p er cent p er y ear (Dav ies et al.1 994 :292) ,and that ofthe defence indu s tries w as m u ch higher than that (Dav ies and H arris on 1 99 7 ).By the tim e ofthe 1 93 9 cens u s ,3 3 p er cent ofthe p op u lation liv ed in tow ns (u p from 1 5 p er cent in 1 9 1 3 ),and 1 9 p er cent ofthe em p loy ed p op u lation (u p from 9 p er cent) w orked in indu s try (Vse soyuzna ya pe re pis '1 992:22,9 6) . The forced indu s trializ ation ofthe 1 93 0s achiev ed a ' Great Breakthrou gh. 'I t changed the s tru ctu re ofthe econom y ab ru p tly ,p u s hing u p the s hares ofindu s try in ou tp u t and em p loy m ent.T he ru s h oflab ou r u p the p rodu ctiv ity gradient from agricu ltu re to indu s try s hou ld hav e im p rov ed allocation in the econom y as a w hole;it s hou ld hav e rais ed ou tp u t p er head acros s the econom y ,m ore rap idly in agricu ltu re than in indu s try .Bu t the ou tcom e w as different:it redu ced p rodu ctiv ity in b oth agricu ltu re and indu s try ,s o that the ov erallres u lts fellfar s hort of ex p ectations (Cherem u khin et al.20 1 7 :61 7 -61 9).I n the p eriod ofthe firs t fiv e-y ear p lan,there w as indu s trialis ation w ithou t grow th (T ab le 1 ab ov e).
Taking a longer v iew ,the dam age to p rodu ctiv ity is not hard to u nders tand.The w orking arrangem ents ofalleconom ic s y s tem s rely on incentiv es and norm s ofb ehav iou r.The Bols hev ik Rev olu tion des troy ed the old incentiv es and norm s and s tru ggled to rep lace them w ith new ones .Priv ate p rop erty w as confis cated in s u cces s iv e w av es from the Rev olu tion of1 9 1 7 to the col lectiv iz ation ofp eas ant farm s ,lau nched at the end of1 929.T he w av es ofconfis cation des troy ed incentiv es to w ork, to s av e,and to innov ate.The fam ine ofthe early 1 9 3 0s aros e from the interp lay ofu nex p ectedly p oor w eather w ith the confis cation ofgrain s tocks to m eet the needs ofindu s trializ ation.Fam ine and the rep res s ion that accom p anied it des troy ed m illions ofliv es .Later in the 1 93 0s ,the p u rges aros e from the p arty leaders 'need to s ecu re their regim e and from Stalin's calcu lation that the greates t danger to the regim e aros e from the ' p otential'and ev en ' u ncons ciou s 'enem ies that w ere hiding arou nd him and m ore w idely in s ociety .The p u rges als o des troy ed m illions ofliv es b y m as s killing and ru ined fu rther m illions b y condem ning the v ictim s not kill ed at once to forced res ettlem ent and s lav e l ab ou r.Their legacy ,like that ofcoll ectiv iz ation,w as a dem oraliz ed s ociety characteriz ed b y m is tru s t and alienation from regim e ob jectiv es and s ocialnorm s .
An econom y w ithou t incentiv es and w ithou t norm s ofb ehav iou r to w hich m os t p eop le are w ill ing to conform s oon col lap s es .Ru s s ia's econom ic his tory p rov ides the cleares t ev idence for this in tw o ep is odes , one the m eltdow n ofthe econom y ofSov iet Ru s s ia im m ediately after the Rev olu tion,and the other the collap s e ofRu s s ia's econom y at the end of com m u nis m .
I t is reas onab le to interp ret the Sov iet ins titu tions b u ilt u nder Stalin in the 1 93 0s as im p rov is ed to rep lace the m arket incentiv es to w ork,s av e, and innov ate b y s u b s titu ting artificialincentiv es to do the s am e things .
Thes e ins titu tions w ere thos e des crib ed in ou r p rev iou s v olu m es :the com p u ls ion to w ork,the w age and s alary s tru ctu res that es tab lis hed m anagers 'and officials 'p rom otion p athw ay s ,the b onu s es for m eeting q u otas ,the p ay m ents to col lectiv e farm s for food s u rp lu s es ,the charges lev ied on farm s for s tate m achinery s erv ices ,the p enalties for s hirking and dis loy alty ,the s y s tem s for forced res ettlem ent and forced lab ou r b y detainees ,and the s p ectru m ofreal,artificial,and ill egalm arkets for goods and lab ou r s erv ices ,inclu ding the calcu lation ofcollectiv e farm lab ou r contrib u tions and their reim b u rs em ent.I n their tim e,thes e ins titu tions w orked,ev en ifthey did not w ork op tim ally or efficiently . That they w orked is s how n b y their res ilience:the Sov iet econom y did not collap s e in the face offam ines (in 1 9 3 3 and 1 94 7 ) or ofdeep inv as ion (in 1 94 1 and 1 9 4 2).I t collap s ed only w hen the centralp oliticalins titu tions fellto p ieces (after 1 98 7 ).
Des p ite this ju dgem ent,w hich s om e m ight interp ret as fav ou rab le,it rem ains the cas e that the incentiv es p rov ided b y the Sov iet econom ic s y s tem w ere alw ay s im p aired and often p erv ers e.The s atis faction of b u reau crats took p recedence ov er the s atis faction offinalcons u m ers liv ing in hou s eholds and ofinterm ediate cons u m ers ru nning b u s ines s es . H igh p erform ance w as rew arded at firs t,and then p enaliz ed b y the b u rden ofhigher ex p ectations .The v alu e ofrew ards w as u ncertain; s im u lated effort w as m ore likely to b e rew arded than dis ru p tiv e innov ation.
The UK and USeconom ies w ou ld s hare m any ofthes e featu res in the com ing W orld W ar,w hen gov ernm ent p riorities rep laced m arket p rices and adm inis trativ e s u cces s indicators rep laced p rofits (Broadb erry and H ow lett 1 996;Rockoff1 996).The Britis h and Am erican w ar econom ies w ere dis tingu is hed from the Sov iet econom y ,how ev er,b y the fact that their decis ion m akers rem ained accou ntab le to the ru le oflaw and p u b lic op inion,w ith s om e lim itations that,althou gh im p ortant,w ere tem p orary , b eing confined to the w ar p eriod.The ab s ence ofalls u ch res traints in the Sov iet econom y p erm itted not only cos tly ex ces s es ofradicalis m b u t als o the m as s incarceration and kill ing ofp eop le in v ery large nu m b ers , inclu ding m any w ho w ere only s u s p ected ofs om e p otentialdis loy al ty and m any ju s t to fillthe q u ota.At w ork this w as refl ected in hars h p enalis ation ofw orkers and m anagers ,s u p p os edly for m is takes or low effort,b u t there w as a l arge random factor in the dis trib u tion of p u nis hm ents ,w hich encou raged ev ery one to s hift their efforts from p rodu ction to s elf-p rotection (Gregory and H arris on 20 0 5 ).T hu s ,b rakes on grow th aros e from ev ery day dis incentiv es that w ere felt b y m any m illions ofp eop le.The frictions cou ld b e ov ercom e only b y the s till greater cou nterv ailing force ofthe s tate,ex p res s ed in a lim ited range of p olicies that relied on s til lm ore coercion.
Under Stalin the Sov iet s tate b ecam e a near m onop olis t ofland, p rodu ctiv e cap ital,and hou s ing,and a near m onop s onis t oflab ou r.Us ed to the fu ll,thes e p ow ers w ere u s ed to dram atic effect.W ithin tw elv e y ears ,nearly one in fiv e w orkers w as s hifted from low er-v alu e job s in agricu ltu re to higher-v alu e job s in indu s try ,trans p ort,and cons tru ction. Ov er a s im ilar p eriod,nearly one third ofGDP w as taken ou t ofp riv ate hands into the hands ofthe s tate. 5 T he s tate u s ed the ex tra one third in its hands to b u ild nationalcap acities ofal lkinds -p rodu ctiv e cap italin s tateow ned indu s try and trans p ort,hu m an cap italthrou gh edu cation,the intangib le cap italofs hared know ledge aris ing from s cientific and technologicalres earch,the s tate cap acity neces s ary to m ob ilis e s ociety and direct efforts ,and the m ilitary p ow er em b odied in a m as s arm y eq u ip p ed w ith large q u antities ofm oderniz ed w eap onry .
To s u m m ariz e,Ru s s ia b egan to indu s trialis e b efore the Firs t W orld W ar,and the econom y ex p anded b oth in the aggregate and in ou tp u t and cons u m p tion p er head.By 1 91 3 ,how ev er,Ru s s ia's indu s trialis ation w as s til lq u ite lim ited.The s ou rces ofits lim itation hav e b een identified in b oth agricu ltu re and indu s try .Agrarian p rop erty rights res tricted the s u p p ly ofres ou rces from agricu ltu re,and the s tru ctu re ofm arkets and corp orate ow ners hip lim ited the dem and for them from indu s try .W hile p olicy reform s cou ld hav e s u rm ou nted thos e ob s tacles w ithin the fram ew ork ofa m arket econom y ,the Bols hev iks chos e an alternativ e p ath to indu s trialis ation.Sw eep ing acts ofconfis cation and coercion b roke throu gh the lim its .T he p ace ofindu s trialis ation that follow ed w as w ithou t p recedent in Ru s s ian his tory .Bu t the indu s trialis ation ofthe Sov iet econom y did not b ring rap id or s tab le econom ic grow th.Econom ic grow th w as lim ited,w as not reflected in higher liv ing s tandards ,and w as continu ally interru p ted b y p eriodic dis as ters that w ere either s elfinflicted or,ifthey had s om e other origin,w ere m ade w ors e b y the p olicy res p ons e.
(B)T hem ea s ur em entofeconom i cper f or m a nce
I n its ap p earance,the p y ram id s tru ctu re ofthe Sov iet p lanned econom y w as arranged s o that orders cou ld flow dow n from the Politb u ro to the p rodu ctiv e u nits ,b ecom ing m ore detailed and m ore dis aggregated at each lev elofthe cas cade.At the s am e tim e,inform ation on the cap acities and 5 One in fiv e w orkers :the change in the s hare ofthe em p loy ed p op u lation b etw een the cens u s ofDecem b er 1 9 26 (u s ing data adju s ted for com p arab ility ) and J anu ary 1 9 3 9,from Dav ies et al. eds 1 994 :27 7 ) . N early one third ofGDP:the change in the GDP s hares ofgov ernm ent cons u m p tion and dom es tic inv es tm ent b etw een 1 928 and 1 9 4 0 (ib id. , 27 2). the p erform ance ofthe p rodu ctiv e u nits w ou ld flow u p w ards to the Politb u ro,p rov iding it w ith the ev idence b as e for the nex t rou nd of orders .
The reality w as s om ew hat different.The p rodu ction ofknow ledge w as highly p oliticis ed,and inform ation flow s w ere contam inated b y p olitical p res s u res at ev ery lev el .From the Politb u ro,Stalin and other leaders s et lim its on w hat cou ld b e know n,and on w hat facts w ou ld b e p olitically accep tab le.At ev ery lev el,m anagers and others res p ons ib le for rep orting p rim ary data u s ed their initiativ e to s hap e the flow s offacts to the criteria ofs u cces s and accep tab ility that w ere fix ed from ab ov e.
I n the p res ent v olu m e w e hav e des crib ed in detailtw o focalp oints for s tatis ticalm anip u lation.One w as the grain harv es t.H ere the p attern w as longs tanding,b eing es tab lis hed in the 1 9 20 s .At that tim e the p arty leaders s ou ght and ap p rov ed op tim is tic p redictions ofthe av ailab ility of grain to s u p p ort their am b itiou s p lans for forced indu s trialis ation,s o that contem p orary harv es t es tim ates b ecam e inflated in com p aris on to p rew ar m eas u res (Vol.1 :63 -66).W hen the harv es t then fells hort,they w is hed not to adm it to the failu re ofan im p ortant p recondition for the s u cces s oftheir p lans ,and to p res s forw ard regardles s .As a res u lt,in the decade cov ered b y ou r s ev en v olu m es ,there w as not one y ear in w hich the harv es t w as rep orted hones tly to the p u b lic.
I n ou r w ork w e hav e identified s u cces s iv e m om ents in the dev elop m ent ofthe s tatis ticalm ethodology for harv es t ev alu ation from the s itu ation that p rev ailed in the 1 920 s .One m om ent cam e in 1 9 3 3 , w hen a harv es t m eas u re b as ed on the ' b iological'y ield (ofthe crop s tanding in the field,after allow ance for harv es ting and s torage los s es ) rep laced the concep t ofthe ' b arn y ield'(ofthe crop after reap ing and thres hing (Vol.5:4 4 2-4 4 7 ).A s econd m om ent cam e in 1 9 3 9 w hen, encou raged b y Stalin and M olotov ,Voz nes ens kiirecom m ended a m ore encom p as s ing concep t ofthe b iologicaly ield,m aking no allow ance for harv es ting and s torage los s es and ev en adding in s u p p os ed p re-harv es t los s es and a factor for u nder-rep orting (Chap ter 4 ).I n p ractice,b oth thes e m om ents p rov ed to b e s tep s on a p ath tow ards increas ing ex aggeration of the harv es t.
W e hav e fou nd that s tatis ticians w ho w ere p rofes s ionally res p ons ib le for harv es t m eas u rem ent p u s hed b ack agains t m anip u lation from tim e to tim e.I n 1 9 3 3 ,for ex am p le,Os ins kii,the incom ing head ofthe new ly form ed Ts GK,p res ented the b iologicaly ield as a m ore ev idence-b as ed harv es t m eas u re w hich,done carefu lly and after tim e for du e cons ideration ofthe aggregated y ield data,w ou ld correct the s u b jectiv ely inflated b arn-y ield es tim ates ofp receding y ears (Vol.5 :24 6-24 7 ).Bu t things did not w ork ou t in the w ay he ev idently hop ed.T he u nderly ing reas on w as that the p oliticalleaders cou ld nev er adm it the failu re oftheir p lans .
I n a highly centralis ed and clos ed p oliticals y s tem ,m os t p rofes s ional s tatis ticians (like other ' ex p erts ') lacked the indep endence to ' s p eak tru th to p ow er. 'W hen the p oliticals y s tem w as als o highly m ob ilis ed to s earch for enem ies and elim inate them ,to s p eak ou t w as not only difficu lt b u t dangerou s .Thos e res p ons ib le for rep orting from low er lev els w ere at leas t as v u lnerab le to the p res s u res oftriu m p halis m as higher officials . N onetheles s ,ev idence ofcontinu ing res is tance to ex aggeration can fou nd in the p attern ofharv es t rep orts ov er tim e.W hen the harv es t w as in p rogres s ,p relim inary harv es t claim s w ere m os t res p ons iv e to the s p irit of v ictory .W hen the harv es t w as in and the flag w av ing w as ov er,it w as eas ier for realis m to p rev ail,and s o finalharv es t rep orts w ere generally m ore s ob er than the p relim inary rep orts s u b m itted w ithin the harv es t p eriod (Tab le E-1 1 ).Ev en s o,the finalharv es t m eas u res b as ed on the b iologicaly ield continu ed to b e s u b s tantially ov ers tated throu gh the 1 93 0 s .As for the m ore encom p as s ing harv es t concep t introdu ced b y Voz nes ens kiiin 1 9 3 9,the change w as then im p os ed retros p ectiv ely to the harv es t rep orts of1 93 6 to 1 93 8 (Chap ter 7 ),b u t not to p rev iou s y ears . The res u lts s oftened the ap p earance ofharv es t failu re of1 93 6,ov ers tated the s u cces s of1 93 7 ,and s u p p orted a fals e im p res s ion ofan u p w ard longterm trend.
A s econd focu s ofs tatis ticalm anip u lation w as the s iz e and grow th of the p op u lation,w hich Stalin cons idered to b e an indicator ofnational p ow er and p ros p erity .On that b as is ,the fiv e-y ear p lans m ade op tim is tic p rojections ofthe p op u lation,w hich did not liv e u p to the ex p ectations p laced u p on it.Am ong the reas ons w as the s u b s tantialm ortality aris ing from food s hortages and rep res s ions .I t dam aged the p arty leaders ' au thority ifits p rojections w ere know n to b e w rong,and it dam aged their legitim acy ifthe p op u lation s hortfallw as attrib u ted (at leas t in p art) to their ow n p olicy failu res .
I n b oth the cens u s es ofthe late 1 93 0s ,as far as w e can tel l,the cens u s w orkers did a p rofes s ionaljob -a s u rp ris e,p erhap s ,giv en the circu m s tances .Bu t the fate oftheir findings (and in s om e cas es their p ers onalfates ) w as entirely dep endent on the leaders 'ov erriding ob jectiv e,w hich w as to s u p p ort Stalin's au thority and cov er u p all ev idence ofm is takes (Chap ter 5 ).I n 1 93 7 the cens u s findings w ere b u ried;in 1 93 9,they w ere m anip u lated b efore p u b lication.The effect of the m anip u lation w as to m ake the Sov iet p op u lation ap p ear to b e larger and m ore rap idly grow ing than w as the cas e,and to s u p p res s ev idence of m illions ofm is s ing p eop le,the cas u alties ofthe 1 93 3 fam ine,es p eciall y am ong the m ale p op u lations ofUkraine and Kaz akhs tan. I t is tru e that the officially accep ted ou tcom e ofthe 1 93 9 cens u s als o rep res ented a m ajor conces s ion to reality .At the ris k oftheir liv es ,the p rofes s ionals tatis ticians p ers u aded Stalin and M olotov to accep t a p op u lation figu re ofarou nd 1 7 0 m illion.This w as 2 to 3 m illion m ore than the cens u s findings ju s tified.Perhap s m ore s ignificantly ,it w as al s o 1 3 m illion les s than the 1 8 3 m illion that any m oderately nu m erate reader ofPra vd a cou ld hav e inferred from Stalin's p rojections .A p os s ib le ex p lanation is that,follow ing the conclu s ion ofthe Great Terror,Stalin w as confident that not a s ingle p ers on w ou ld p oint this ou t.
The b oos ting ofclaim ed res u lts that w e hav e des crib ed in dem ograp hy and agricu ltu re ex em p lifies p ractices that affected m os t ifnot allas p ects ofSov iet econom ic m eas u rem ent.A third focalp oint ofm anip u lation w as the s y s tem ofaccou nting for p lanned p rodu ction and p rices .
The p res ence ofm anip u lation in Sov iet m eas u res ofrealou tp u t has b een long es tab lis hed.I n 1 93 9,the realv olu m e ofSov iet econom ic activ ity w as tw ice that of1 91 3 (on the s am e territory ),and als o of1 928 (Tab le 1 ). T his w as b as ed on the recons tru ction ofthe Sov iet p rodu ction accou nts from the b ottom u p ,on the b as is ofadm ittedly incom p lete p u b lis hed data,b y indep endent w es tern s cholars .I t w as not the p ictu re p res ented b y Sov iet officials tatis tics ofou tp u t and p rodu ctiv ity . According to an officialm eas u re,b as ed on the p lan p rices of1 9 26/27 , realSov iet m aterialp rodu ction in 1 94 0 ex ceeded that of1 9 28 b y a factor not oftw o b u t ofm ore than fiv e (N a rod noe khozya istvo1 95 5 :1 6).
Ov er the s horter p eriod cov ered b y the p res ent v olu m e,w e can contras t Sov iet officialand w es tern m eas u res ofthe realgrow th of indu s try and ofthe econom y as a w hole from 1 93 7 to 1 94 0 (Tab le 2;s ee Vol.6:x v ifor s im ilar b u t s m aller dis crep ancies ov er the p eriod ofou r p rev iou s v olu m e).As the figu res s how ,Sov iet rep orts and w es tern es tim ates agree that the nom inalv alu e ofnationalincom e in ru b les and the p rices p rev ailing at the tim e increas ed from 1 93 7 to 1 9 4 0 b y ab ou t one half.A gap em erges only w hen correction is m ade for inflation.T he Sov iet s tatis tics ,w hich again u s ed the p lan p rices of1 926/27 ,claim ed that the realnationalincom e increas ed b y one third in ju s t three y ears , and realindu s trialp rodu ction b y 4 5 p er cent.The W es tern es tim ates als o s how realgrow th,b u t ofno m ore one fifth,w hether ou r focu s is on indu s try or on the econom y as a w hole.
Ta b le 2 ne a rhe re
H ow did thes e gap s aris e? Sov iet m eas u res ofthe realv olu m e of ou tp u t relied on the fix ed p rices u s ed to p lan the econom y ,that is ,to s et p rodu ction q u otas in ru b les that cou ld b e dev olv ed to m inis tries and their enterp ris es at the b eginning ofthe p lan p eriod and u s ed afterw ards to ev alu ate their p erform ance agains t the p lan.This req u ired a fix ed s tandard ofv alu e,in order to p rev ent m anagers from fu lfilling the q u ota b y the s im p le ex p edient ofrais ing p rices .T he s tandard ofv alu e chos en for the firs t fiv e-y ear p lan w as the ' u nchanged p rices of1 926/27 . 'I n the 1 93 0 s (and in fact u p to 1 95 0 ) the p lans handed dow n to Sov iet m anagers at ev ery lev elw ere u s u al ly denom inated in thes e p rices .(I n this res p ect the p lans for the harv es t and the p op u lation,w hich w ere s et ou t in u nam b igu ou s p hy s icalu nits ,w ere u nty p ical.T he p rob lem for the accou ntab le officials w as the s am e,how ev er:how to m anip u late the p erform ance indicator to s how s u cces s ).
The u nderly ing s ou rces ofb ias in Sov iet accou nting for p lanned p rodu ction are now w ellknow n (Dav ies and W heatcroft 1 99 4 :3 0-3 2; Dav ies 1 994 :1 3 8 -1 4 1 ;H arris on 1 998 ;H arris on 20 00 ).Ov ers tated claim s did not aris e from any high-lev elau thority for m anagers to lie ab ou t achiev em ents .M anagers w ere cau ght ly ing from tim e to tim e,b u t they took great ris ks w hen they did s o b ecau s e to hoodw ink the au thorities b y fab ricating res u lts w as a s eriou s crim e.Rather,higher officials im p os ed continu ou s p res s u re on m anagers to m eet p erform ance indicators and to dem ons trate ou ts tanding res u lts ,and m anagers res p onded b y finding les s ris ky w ay s to s atis fy ap p earances w ithou t u ndu e effort.W hile there w ere m any s u ch s tratagem s ,thos e that w ere q u antitativ ely im p ortant ex p loited an intrins ic w eaknes s in the p lan's s tandard ofv alu e,the ' u nchanged' p rices of1 926/27 .T he w eaknes s aros e b ecau s e,as 1 926/27 receded into the p as t,the s cop e increas ed to v ary the q u alities ofp rodu cts that had b een p rodu ced and p riced in 1 926/27 ,and als o to introdu ce entirely new p rodu cts .From this there follow ed the op p ortu nity to s et new ' u nchanged'p lan p rices for the u p graded and new p rodu cts ,w hich w ere generally b as ed on u nit cos ts at the tim e the changes w ere m ade.Becau s e this w as an era ofhigh inflation,and inflation w as p articu larly rap id in the early 1 93 0s ,s u ch new ' u nchanged'p lan p rices w ere alw ay s higher than the old ones .As a res u lt,it w as generally eas ier to s how realgrow th and to s atis fy the p lan w ith new er p rodu cts than w ith older ones ,the p lan p rices ofw hich rem ained anchored in 1 926/27 .
As the p rodu ct p rofile ofthe Sov iet econom y lengthened,s o did the lis ts of' u nchanged'p lan p rices ,and the new additions w ere alw ay s til ted tow ards the higher p rice lev elcu rrent at the tim e ofeach s u cces s iv e innov ation.The ou tcom e w as a b ias that w as p articu larly fav ou rab le to thos e b ranches ofindu s try w here p rodu ct changes w ere p articu larly rap id,s u ch as the m achine-b u ilding and m etalw orking indu s tries and es p ecial ly m ilitary m achine-b u ilding.T he m anager ofa b akery p rodu cing a s tandard Sov iet loafofb read y ear after y ear had little op p ortu nity to m ake the changes that w ou ld allow the p rodu ction as s ortm ent to b e rep riced fav ou rab ly .I n the aircraft indu s try ,in contras t,the aerop lane of 1 93 9 w as u nrecognis ab le b y the s tandards ofthe 1 920 s .The entire p rodu ction p rofile ofan aircraft factory changed from y ear to y ear w ith ex trem e rap idity ,and each s u cces s iv e des ign w as radically different from its p redeces s or.I t is not s u rp ris ing to find,therefore,that m eas u res ofthe realgrow th ofheav y indu s try ov er tim e in p lan p rices and in cu rrent p rices w ere v irtu ally identical.I t w as only in the cons u m er indu s tries , w here p rodu ct im p rov em ents and new p rodu cts w ere les s encou raged, that m eas u red grow th in the p lan p rices of1 926/27 lagged s u b s tantial ly b ehind.
As in accou nting for grain and for b irth and deaths ,the p rofes s ional s tatis ticians res p ons ib le for p lanned p rodu ction w ere aw are ofthe b ias es in the s y s tem they op erated,dis cu s s ed them in p riv ate,and dev is ed s chem es to try to lim it them .The m os t ob v iou s s olu tion lay in freq u ent u p dating ofthe b as e y ear.I n the p eriod ofou r v olu m es there w as one attem p t at s u ch a reform ,w hich w as ordered in Sep tem b er 1 9 3 3 b y Sov narkom and im p lem ented in Feb ru ary 1 9 3 5 for the com p ilation ofthe 1 93 6 p lan.Bu t the reform encou ntered s trong res is tance and,w hile s om e m inor rationalis ation w as achiev ed,1 9 26/27 w as retained as the b as e y ear.T he m os t im p ortant s ou rce ofcons erv atis m w as ev idently the des ire ofthe au thorities not to hav e the s tatis ticians rev alu e the s ectors ofthe econom y in s u ch a w ay that its m os t rap idly grow ing b ranches w ou ld hav e les s w eight in the aggregate grow th rate that w ou ld b e claim ed in p u b lic (H arris on 1 9 98 :1 0 4 8 ).I n this s ens e,the p arty leaders ex p res s ed a clear p reference for ex aggeration.
The Sov iet accou nts did not only s y s tem atically ov ers tate the dy nam is m ofthe econom y .T hey als o u nders tated the b u rdens of accu m u lation and defence.W e s ee this w hen w e tu rn to s hares ofincom e denom inated in cu rrent p rices ,that is ,in the ru b le p rices u s ed for trans actions in the Sov iet econom y at the tim e.T he m ain is s u e w as the s u b s idy ofp rices ofp rodu cts u s ed for accu m u lation and defence,w hich w as p artly p aid ou t ofthe tax ation ofcons u m er goods and s erv ices . Becau s e ofthis ,the p rices ofcons u m er goods w ere rais ed ab ov e their ' factor cos ts ,'w hile the p rices ofindu s trialm aterials and civ ilian and m ilitary eq u ip m ent w ere held dow n.W hen m eas u red in thes e p rices ,the s hares ofnationalincom e allocated to inv es tm ent w ere s y s tem atically low er in Sov iet m eas u res than in W es tern es tim ates ,w hich attem p ted to identify the ' factor cos ts 'ofSov iet activ ities b y rem ov ing tax es and s u b s idies .The s am e w as tru e,althou gh to a les s er ex tent,for defence (Tab le 3 ).The s u b s idies ofaccu m u lation and defence p ers is ted throu gh the the lifetim e ofthe Sov iet s y s tem ,s erv ing the s am e fu nction that is s om etim es fou nd b ehind w artim e controls in m arket econom ies :to ' s u p p res s one ofthe indicators that the gov ernm ent is inv olv ed in an ex p ens iv e enterp ris e'(Rockoff20 1 2:1 1 ,w riting ab ou t p rice controls as a w ay ofs u p p res s ing w artim e inflation).
Ta b le 3 ne a rhe re
An effect ofthe m anip u lations and b ias es in Sov iet econom ic s tatis tics w as that the Politb u ro w as m is inform ed alm os t as freq u ently as the p u b lic.Occas ions w hen the p arty leaders ordered the p u b lication ofone s et offacts ,know ing them to b e fab ricated,and hav ing acces s to another s et that it b eliev ed to b e the u nv arnis hed tru th,w ere rare.One s u ch ex am p le w as the decis ion to fals ify the defence line in the Sov iet s tate b u dget from 1 93 1 to 1 93 5 in order to concealthe rap id grow th ofdefence ou tlay s at the tim e ofthe W orld Dis arm am ent Conference in Genev a (Vol. 4 :1 1 7 -1 1 8 ).I n that cas e,the leaders knew the tru th,and thos e res p ons ib le for fu nding defence w ere in no dou b t that that they s hou ld s u p p ly fu nds in line w ith the s ecret b u dget line,not the p u b lis hed one. Stalin's decis ion to declare a larger p op u lation than that fou nd b y the cens u s takers in 1 93 9,leading to fab rication ofthe p u b lis hed res u lts of the cens u s ,dis cu s s ed in the p res ent v olu m e (Chap ter 5 ),has s om e s im ilarities .Ev en ifthe p u b lis hed res u lts ofthe cens u s fals ified the nu m b ers and w hereab ou ts ofthe ' s p ecialcontingents 'ofthe arm ed forces and the forced lab ou r s y s tem ,Stalin knew w hat the p relim inary res u lts of the cens u s had rev ealed,and thos e in charge ofthe Defence Com m is s ariat and the N KVD knew p erfectly w el lw ho w as u nder their controland w here they w ere.Bu t in the generalru n ofSov iet s tatis ticalp ractices ,the ins tances w here the Politb u ro knew the tru th and ordered the p u b lic to b e told a lie w ere s om ew hat u nu s u al.M ore com m only ,ifthe tru th cou ld not b e rev ealed,the p u b lic w as told nothing at al l.
Als o com m on,how ev er,w as the s tatis ticalex aggeration that aros e s p ontaneou s ly from the u niv ers alp res s u re to declare v ictory in the s tru ggle to im p lem ent the p arty 's directiv es .This tendency w as felt at ev ery lev el,high and low ,and in ev ery locality from the field and factory to the m inis terialb oardroom .T here w ere p eriodic attem p ts to check it, m ade v is ib le b y the efforts ofs tatis ticians to ex ercis e the critical,s cep tical fu nction that is es s entialto their p rofes s ion.Bu t s u ch efforts w ere too feeb le,too infreq u ent,and too threatening to p ow erfu linteres ts to b e effectiv e.One res u lt w as that,on s u ch b as ic m atters as the rate ofgrow th ofp lanned p rodu ction,the Politb u ro w as as likely to b e m is inform ed as the p u b lic.Unlike the p u b lic,Stalin and M olotov had the chance from tim e to tim e to au thoris e im p rov em ents ofthe s tatis ticals y s tem ,or to p rev ent deteriorations ,or to s cale dow n the atm os p here oftriu m p halis m that created the incentiv es for ev ery one b elow them to ex p loit the s y s tem 's w eaknes s es ,and w hen they w ere offered the op p ortu nity they ty p icall y chos e not to.I n that s ens e w e can s ay that they p referred to b e fooled b y their ow n p rop aganda,b u t it is im p ortant to u nders tand that this w as not u nw illing or u nw itting on their p art.
(C)M i l i ta r i za ti on:aw a reconom y i npea ceti m e
The econom ic s y s tem that Stalin b u ilt in the 1 93 0 s p ers is ted,w ith rem arkab le continu ity ,to the end ofthe Sov iet Union.The w ay oflife that the Sov iet Union im p os ed on its citiz ens w ou ld b e u tterly u nfam iliar to W es tern readers ofthe m illennialgeneration.Bu t their grandp arents and great-grandp arents ,w ho liv ed throu gh the w orld w ars ofthe tw entieth centu ry ,ev en ifthey s aw only the ex ternalap p earance ofthe Sov iet neighb ou rhood or w orkp lace,w ou ld q u ickly hav e recogniz ed it.This w as the atm os p here ofa cou ntry at w ar and u nder s iege.At w ork,long hou rs ofeffort w ere m otiv ated b y p atriotic ap p eals and m anaged b y regim entation.H ou s ehold goods and s erv ice w ere often u nav ailab le. There w ere s hortages in the s tores and q u eu es in the s treets .At hom e there w as au s terity ,leav ened b y occas ionalp leas u res ,s om etim es forb idden.Slackers and s p ecu lators lu rked in the s hadow s ,to b e tolerated or ex p os ed and elim inated dep ending on the p eriod and s eas on.
N o one ex p res s ed this m ore p ointedly than the Polis h econom is t, Os kar Lange (1 9 62:1 8 ).I n a lectu re that he deliv ered in Belgrade in 1 9 57 , not long after Khru s hchev 's denu nciation ofStalin,he des crib ed the generic featu res ofa w ar econom y ,p ointing ou t how clos ely they res em b led thos e ofthe Stalinis t com m and s y s tem :
Concentration ofallres ou rces tow ards one b as ic ob jectiv e ... , centraliz ation ofdis p os alofres ou rces in order to av oid leakages of res ou rces to ev ery thing that w as cons idered non-es s ential... Allocation ofres ou rces b y adm inis trativ e decis ion according to adm inis trativ ely es tab lis hed p riorities and large-s cale u s e ofp olitical incentiv es to m aintain the p rodu ctiv ity and dis cip line oflab ou r throu gh p atriotic ap p eals . 6 I fone as ked how the Bols hev iks cam e u p on this m odel,the ans w er w as that they fou nd it not in the econom ic ideas ofM arx and Engels ,b u t in the liv ed ex p erience ofthe Firs t W orld W ar,the firs t inters tate conflict ofm odern tim es that w as fou ght b y m as s arm ies eq u ip p ed b y m as s indu s trialp rodu ction.The Bols hev iks ob s erv ed clos ely how the cap italis t cou ntries m anaged their res ou rces for this conflict,and they w atched and adm ired,in p articu lar,the ex p erience ofGerm any ,m ob iliz ed for totalw ar b y W alther Rathenau and Erich Lu dendorff.On taking p ow er in their ow n cou ntry ,they s et ab ou t im p lem enting this m odelw ith enthu s ias m . Unencu m b ered b y p riv ate p rop erty rights and cons titu tionalres traints , they ex p ected that they w ou ld do a b etter job than the Germ ans .Bu t the Bols hev iks als o q u ickly forgot w here they fou nd their ins p iration,as Lange (1 962:1 9) him s elfacknow ledged:
One ofthe m ethods ofw ar econom y ,w hich m os t ofthe s ocialis t cou ntries hav e res orted to at one s tage or another,is the com p u ls ory deliv ery b y p eas ants ofp art oftheir p rodu ct.M any Com m u nis ts in Poland feelrather u p s et b y the p res ent p rogram m e ofou r gov ernm ent ofab olis hing s u ch deliv eries .Iu s u ally ans w er them b y as king ifthey rem em b er w ho firs t introdu ced com p u ls ory deliv eries in Poland.For, the fact is that s u ch deliv eries w ere firs t introdu ced du ring the Firs t W orld W ar b y the occu p ation arm y ofKais er W ilhelm the Second, w hom Ido not think any b ody regards as a cham p ion ofs ocialis m .
The trans form ation ofthe econom y u nder Sov iet ru le w as dram atic in al lits b ranches ,b u t the changes w ere les s s triking in s om e than in others . To m os t ap p earances ,a great m otor factory w as organiz ed on s im ilar lines w hether in M os cow or in Detroit.Likew is e,a great s teelm illw as recognis ab ly s im ilar in M agnitogors k and in Gary ,I ndiana.Su ch s im ilarities s hou ld not b e s u rp ris ing,b ecau s e the Bols hev iks als o adm ired Am erican m as s p rodu ction and the s cale and centraliz ation ofp rodu ction that it fos tered.
The trans form ation w as at its m os t ex trem e in farm ing.Ru s s ia w as a cou ntry w here,for a thou s and y ears ,w ithou t ins tru ction,farm ers had follow ed the rhy thm ofthe s eas ons ,p lanting and s ow ing in au tu m n and s p ring,endu ring the w inter,reap ing and thres hing in s u m m er.N o one from that b ackgrou nd can hav e im agined that in the fou rth decade ofthe tw entieth centu ry ,on orders from M os cow ,tens ofm ill ions offarm ers w ou ld hav e b een regim ented in b attle form ation to ris e u p and occu p y a m illion s q u are kilom etres ofland to b e p lou ghed,s ow n,reap ed,and thres hed on a w eekly s chedu le in m ilitariz ed s tru ggles m arked b y v ictories ,s etb acks ,cam p aign m edals for heroes ,and ex em p lary p u nis hm ent for des erters . M os t s trikingly ,allthis w as b rou ght ab ou t in tim e ofp eace,for the Sov iet Union w as not at w ar w hen it col lectiv iz ed agricu ltu re,any m ore than w hen it b u ilt M agnitorgors k.I t is tru e that,in the p eriod b etw een the tw o W orld W ars ,' p eacetim e'w as often a relativ e concep t.Sov iet b orders w ere continu ally dis p u ted,and thes e dis p u tes s om etim es eru p ted into op en conflict.Bu t,w hile Sov iet m il itary p lanning continu ally env is aged ex is tentialthreats and drew u p p lans to dealw ith them (Sam u els on 200 0 ),the Sov iet Union did not face any realand p res ent danger from 1 920 ,w hen the Red Arm y w ithdrew from Poland,to 1 93 7 ,the y ear in w hich J ap anes e leaders b egan to p u s h the ' northern's trategy of ex p ans ion into Sib eria (Paine 20 1 2:1 4 6-1 4 8 ),and H itler b egan to tu rn w ar on the eas tern front from a contingency to a p lan (Adam thw aite 1 99 2:7 1 ).
I fthe Sov iet regim entation ofindu s try and the indu s trialw orker s how ed how far the centraliz ation ofm as s p rodu ction cou ld p roceed,the m ilitariz ation ofagricu ltu re s how ed its lim its .I n M os cow ,the centraliz ed s tate p laced great s tres s u p on its detailed p lans for agricu ltu ral op erations .The tru th,how ev er,s eem s to b e that this m erely im p os ed the ap p earance oforder on tas ks that w ou ld b e p erform ed any w ay ,as and w hen the ru ralcadres w ou ld get arou nd to them .I n p ractice,the harv es t w as m u ch les s res p ons iv e to centraliz ed p lans than to the w eather.This cou ld b e ob s erv ed from y ear to y ear.Bu t in 1 93 7 ,s p ecifically ,s om ething m ore cou ld b e ob s erv ed.I n that y ear the nom enklatu ra p u rge w reaked hav oc am ong the officials res p ons ib le for b oth m anaging and coordinating al lb ranches ofthe econom y .Bu t the res u lts w ere not the s am e in all b ranches .I n indu s try and trans p ort,p rodu ction w as v is ib ly dis organis ed, and p rodu ctiv ity declined s harp ly .I n agricu ltu ralp rodu ction,in contras t, there w as no p articu lar effect.T he w eather w as b etter than av erage,and s o the harv es t w as b etter than av erage,regardles s ofthe chaos in the b u reau cracy .W hat w as affected b y the dis organis ation at the centre w as not agricu ltu ralp rodu ction b u t dis trib u tion:the s tate failed to cap tu re the gains from the good harv es t (Chap ter 4 (G)).I n 1 93 8 and 1 9 3 9 that cap acity had to b e reb u ilt (Chap ter 7 ).This confirm s that Sov iet s tate cap acity for agricu ltu re w as focu s ed on ex traction;it p lay ed little or no p rodu ctiv e role.
Long b efore 1 93 9,the Sov iet Union looked like a cou ntry at w ar.For the s ake ofnationaltargets for p rodu ction and for econom ic and m ilitary cons tru ction,allofs ociety w as m ob ilis ed in m ilitary -s ty le cam p aigns that celeb rated herois m and p enalis ed s hirking and des ertion.W e s ee the s am e in other cou ntries in the tw entieth centu ry ,b u t only w hen totalw ar w as b eing w aged or activ ely p rep ared.T he m ilitariz ation ofthe Sov iet econom y w as facilitated b y the indu s trialtechnologies ofthe tim e,w hich p rom oted m as s p rodu ction and m ade centralis ed coordination relativ ely effectiv e.Bu t m ilitariz ation w as als o ap p lied to Sov iet agricu ltu re,w here the p rodu ctiv e retu rns to s tandardis ation and coordination w ere low or negativ e.W hile the m ilitaris ation ofagricu ltu re w as dam aging to p rodu ction,how ev er,it s til lb enefited the s tate b y enhancing controls ov er the dis trib u tion ofagricu ltu ralp rodu ce.
(D)T heem er genceoftheS ovi etU ni ona saw or l dpow er
By 1 93 9 ,the Sov iet Union ranked alongs ide Germ any as one ofthe w orld's tw o leading p rodu cers ofw eap ons .Glob ally ,av iation w as the b ranch ofm ilitary oftechnology that adv anced m os t rap idly du ring the interw ar p eriod.Av iation w as als o the technol ogy on w hich the great p ow ers p laced their greates t hop es .Fighters and b om b ers ,it w as w idel y b eliev ed,w ou ld enab le a cou ntry to attack its adv ers aries from a dis tance. The s am e fighters and b om b ers w ou ld p rov ide the m eans ofdefence and deterrence.Som e ofthes e hop es w ere ex aggerated or p rem atu re,b u t the fact rem ains :air p ow er,or the lack ofit,w as decis iv e in ev ery theatre in the Second W orld W ar.Ev ery m ajor p ow er com m itted at leas t one q u arter ofits w artim e b u dget for m ilitary eq u ip m ent to av iation and air forces (O'Brien 20 1 5 :23 ,3 8 -3 9,5 3 ,60 ;H arris on 201 6).I t is notab le, therefore,that,as the w ar b roke ou t in 1 9 3 9,the Sov iet Union p rodu ced m ore than one q u arter ofthe w orld's m ilitary aircraft,and w as the s econd Legitim ate q u es tions m ight b e rais ed concerning the relativ e q u ality of Sov iet m ilitary p ow er,inclu ding w eap onry .Su ch defects certainly ex is ted and w ou ld b e ex p os ed b y the ex p erience ofthe b attlefield;this hap p ened in the w inter w ar of1 93 9/4 0 w ith Finland and,on a m u ch larger s cale,in the firs t p eriod ofthe Sov iet-Germ an w ar that b egan in J u ne 1 94 1 .W hen w ar trans p ired,how ev er,and the q u alitativ e defects ofSov iet arm am ents w ere ex p os ed in com b at,Sov iet indu s try w ou ld p rov e fu lly cap ab le of forcing the neces s ary technologicalim p rov em ents to the ex tent that Sov iet arm am ents w ou ld ev entu ally p rev ail.
The p rew ar p os ition ofthe Sov iet econom y as a w orld-clas s s u p p lier ofm ilitary eq u ip m ent had b road fou ndations .I t w as the goalto w hich v as t efforts had b een directed s ince the m id-1 9 20s ,w hen the p olitical leaders b egan to receiv e increas ingly p recis e form u lations ofthe p rob lem of' fu tu re w ar'from the Red Arm y . 7 I n av iation,arm ou r,arm am ent,and am m u nition,the later Sov iet m ilitary -indu s trialcom p lex w as largely created in the 1 9 3 0s .M eas u red b y the nu m b er ofres earch,des ign,and 
Ta b le 6 ne a rhe re .
Underly ing the grow th ofthe defence indu s try w as the p rop agation of al lb ranches ofm odern heav y indu s try and engineering,w hich s u p p orted rearm am ent b y s u p p ly ing indu s try and the arm ed forces w ith m etals and m etalgoods ,fu els ,and chem icals .M any ofthes e goods w ere ' du alp u rp os e,'that is ,they cou ld b e ap p lied eq u ally to civ ilian and m ilitary u s es .Ev ery day ex am p les ranged from engines and m otor v ehicles to nitrates ,w hich held chem icalenergy in u ns tab le com p ou nds that w ere ap p licab le b oth for p lant fertiliz ation and for ex p los iv es .As rearm am ent w as p u rs u ed w ith increas ing u rgency ,thes e goods w ere directed increas ingly tow ards the defence s ector at the ex p ens e ofciv ilian p rodu ction and hou s ehold cons u m p tion.
The em ergence ofthe Sov iet Union as a w orld-clas s m ilitary p ow er m ight b e thou ght s u rp ris ing w hen v iew ed from s om e angles ,thou gh not others .The elem ent ofs u rp ris e aris es p artly from the Bols hev ik narrativ e, w hich rep eatedly em p has iz ed Ru s s ia's his toricb ackw ardnes s ,its lack of m odern indu s tries and technologies ,its v u lnerab ility to p enetration and aggres s ion b y hos tile forces ,the likelihood that ex ternalenem ies w ou ld v ictim iz e it for thes e w eaknes s es ,and the reactiv e,defens iv e character of its w ar p rep arations .From that p ers p ectiv e,it is dis concerting to find that,b y the end ofou r p eriod,the Sov iet Union dis p os ed ofas m any w eap ons in a y ear as another great p ow er,Germ any ,that w as to a cons iderab le ex tent already m ob iliz ed for a w ar w ith other great p ow ers , a w ar that its leaders had long p lanned and now initiated.
From another p ers p ectiv e,the Sov iet p os ition as a w orld l eader in m ilitary p rodu ction is les s s u rp ris ing.The Sov iet Union w as one ofa handfu lofcou ntries w ith enou gh s iz e in p op u lation and natu ralres ou rces to contend for glob alleaders hip .I m p erialRu s s ia,the p redeces s or ofthe Sov iet s tate,had p articip ated w il lingly in the great-p ow er riv alry ofthe nineteenth and early tw entieth centu ries .Ev en if,in other as p ects ,the Bols hev iks em p has iz ed their b reak w ith Ru s s ia's p as t,in the as p ect of internationalaffairs they declared from the ou ts et the neces s ity of res toring Ru s s ia as a great p ow er.This w as ex p res s ed,ab ov e al l,b y Lenin w hen he p u t forw ard the goalto ' catch u p and ov ertake'the im p erialis t p ow ers in econom ic and m ilitary cap ab ilities ,and b y Stalin w hen he delib erately echoed this goal.
Prep aration for ' fu tu re w ar'w as an ex p licit m otiv ation b ehind allthe m os t cons eq u entialdecis ions ofSov iet econom ic p olicy in the 1 9 20s and 1 93 0 s .A great ob s tacle that confronted the decis ion m akers w as that,in Ru s s ia after the end ofthe Civ ilW ar (as in ev ery other Eu rop ean cou ntry after the Great W ar),a l onging for p eace w as w ides p read,s o that m any citiz ens w ere u nw illing to b e fu rther regim ented and forced to m ake fu rther s acrifices (Sokolov 20 0 8 ;Velikanov a 20 1 3 :3 3 -3 6).The Stalinis t com m and s y s tem cou ld em erge only b y cens oring this longing and ov erw helm ing it b y ceas eles s p rop aganda ofthe ex ternalthreat and the dangers p os ed b y the enem y w ithin.
Conclu ding the p res ent v olu m e (Chap ter 9 (E)),w e s ou ght to u nders tand the Sov iet-Germ an rap p rochem ent ofthe las t s u m m er b efore the Second W orld W ar.The s u dden w arm ing ofrelations b etw een the tw o p ow ers at that tim e help s to clarify the long-s tanding character ofSov iet great-p ow er am b itions .I n Au gu s t 1 93 9,Stalin's Ru s s ia and H itler's Germ any dis p lay ed b oth com m onalities and differences .T he tw o leaders had in com m on their op p os ition to the ex is ting b ou ndaries ofthe Eu rop ean s tates and the b alance ofp ow er that w ent w ith it.T he goals of Stalin's foreign and m ilitary p olicies ,like H itler's ,w ent b ey ond ' defence' in the narrow ,literals ens e ofp as s iv e res p ons e to im m ediate threat. Defence u nder Stalin w as forw ard-looking,calib rated to a w ide range of fu tu re threats and fu tu re op p ortu nities .I t w as als o activ e,and activ ely rev is ionis t,in s eeking op p ortu nities for adv antage ov er his cou ntry 's neighb ou rs at the cos t oftheir integrity and s ov ereignty .
The com p aris on has its lim its .T he foreign and m ilitary p olicies of Stalin's Ru s s ia and H itler's Germ any w ere not the s am e.W hile H itler activ ely p lanned to s ecu re w orld dom ination for Germ any w ithin his ow n lifetim e,the Bols hev iks had s helv ed the p ros p ect ofw orld rev olu tion,at leas t for a tim e.W hen the op p ortu nities aros e,Stalin w as p leas ed to res tore Sov iet controlofneighb ou ring territories in 1 93 9-1 94 0,and he w ou ld m ake and take op p ortu nities to do s o in 1 94 4 -1 9 4 5 .Bu t he w as no m ore than an op p ortu nis t,w hen com p ared w ith H itl er as a s trategis t.This gav e H itler the adv antage in the Sov iet-Germ an friends hip of1 93 9;b oth s ides s ou ght to u s e each other for s hort-term gain,b u t it w as Germ any that held the initiativ e,m aking the al liance in the firs t p lace,then b reaking it b y w ar in 1 9 4 1 .
The Sov iet p u rs u it ofgreat-p ow er s tatu s w as a long-term p roject, finally realis ed after the Second W orld W ar,b u t already a cons iderab le s u cces s b efore the w ar b roke ou t.I fthere s hou ld b e an elem ent of s u rp ris e,it is b ecau s e great-p ow er s tatu s w as achiev ed w ithou t ' catching u p and ov ertaking'the Sov iet Union's riv als in p rodu ctiv ity and m as s p ros p erity .I n the Second W orld W ar the Sov iet Union w as ab le to riv al Germ any -a cou ntry ofs im ilar econom ic s iz e,m eas u red b y its realGDP, b u t w ith a longer and deep er his tory ofindu s trialrev olu tion,s kills ,and edu cation,and higher ov erallliv ing s tandards and p rodu ctiv ity .After the w ar,the Sov iet Union b ecam e a glob alnu clear s u p erp ow er to riv althe United States ,althou gh the Am erican econom y w as m u ch larger and m ore p rodu ctiv e than ev en Germ any 's .The com b ined ex p erience ofm any cou ntries in tw o w orld w ars s how s that,as a ru le,cou ntries oflow er p rew ar p rodu ctiv ity w ere m u ch les s ab le to m ob iliz e their econom ies for totalw ar in allres p ects that w e can eas ily m eas u re.Bu t the ru le is p rov ed b y one clear ex cep tion.T he Sov iet Union,a relativ ely p oor cou ntry ,s hou ld hav e failed the tes t ofthe Second W orld W ar,m u ch as I m p erialRu s s ia failed in the Firs t W orld W ar (H arris on 20 1 5 :67 -98 ).The fact that the Sov iet Union did not failis tes tim ony to the m ob iliz ation cap acity ofthe econom ic s y s tem that Lenin and Stalin b u ilt,and to the ru thles s nes s w ith w hich they ex p loited its p rop erties .
M eas u red agains t civ ilian criteria ofp rodu ctiv ity and p ros p erity ,the Sov iet econom y ofthe 1 93 0 s failed.M eas u red agains t b enchm arks of nationalcap ab ility ,s u ch as m ilitary p ow er,it l ooks far m ore s u cces s fu l.A dis tinctiv e and endu ring featu re ofthe Sov iet econom y w as its cap acity to s u p p ort m ilitary p ow er ou t ofp rop ortion to its lev elofdev elop m ent.By the end ofou r s tory in 1 93 9,the Sov iet econom y w as one ofthe firs t p rodu cers ofm ilitary hardw are in the w orld,eq u alled only b y Germ any u nder nationals ocialis m .This is rem arkab le,giv en that b y the end of 1 93 9 Germ any w as fu lly engaged in the firs t ofa s eries ofw ars that w as intended to end in v ictory ov er allthe other great p ow ers .
(E)T her ef or m a bi l i ty oftheS ovi eteconom y
Soon after Stalin's death,reform -m inded econom is ts ,am ong them Os kar Lange in Poland,b egan to dis cu s s op enly w hether it w as p os s ib le to reform the Sov iet-ty p e econom y .The root cau s e oftheir dis s atis faction w as the p os ition ofthe gov ernm ent as the com p u ls ory p u rchas er of nearly ev ery thing.T he gov ernm ent dictated w hat w as to b e p rodu ced, p aid for it,and then s old it on to the ev entu alu s ers -the indu s trialand m ilitary u s ers ofeq u ip m ent and m aterials ,and the hou s ehold u s ers of food,clothing,and cons u m er s erv ices .This s y s tem gav e the p arty leaders in the Politb u ro im m ens e dis cretion ov er im m ediate al locations ,b u t it als o b roke the link b etw een the s el ler and the finalu s er;it b u ilt neglect of p u b lic as s ets ,dis dain for the cons u m er,and res is tance to innov ation into the Sov iet econom y .The reform ers ofthe p os t-Stalin p eriod s ou ght, therefore,to res tore the direct link b etw een b u y er and s eller b y w idening the s p here ofm arket ex change w hile retaining the p rop erty fram ew ork of s tate-ow ned enterp ris es and offices and collectiv e farm s .
I t is correctly s u p p os ed that Stalin res is ted s u ch reform s .I t is w idely b eliev ed that the s earch for s olu tions therefore b egan only after Stal in's death,b u t this is w rong.Ou r res earch in the archiv es has s how n,in contras t,that thos e w ho op erated the s y s tem from day to day b ecam e aw are ofits adv ers e cons eq u ences and b egan to look for s olu tions alm os t im m ediately ,althou gh m u ch oftheir s earch rem ained hidden from the p u b lic.I n other w ords ,the cas e for reform b ecam e ev ident to ins iders from the v ery b eginning;it did not w ait to aris e u ntilthe Sov iet econom y had b ecom e indu s triall y m ore dev elop ed.
Early attem p ts at reform w ere aim ed at b oth indu s try and agricu ltu re (Vol.4 :1 1 -1 8 ,20 1 -28 ,265 -7 0 ,3 4 5-6).I n 1 93 1 and the firs t m onths of 1 93 2,m eas u res w ere adop ted to redu ce the p res s u re on agricu ltu re,to im p rov e incentiv es for the p eas ants to p articip ate in the coll ectiv e farm s , and to giv e u rb an cons u m ers acces s to the kolkhoz hou s eholds 'p riv ate p rodu ce throu gh the ' kolkhoz m arkets . 'Thes e m eas u res w ere s oon ov erw helm ed b y the ons et offam ine follow ing the failed harv es t of1 93 2 (Vol.5).N onetheles s ,s om e as p ects ofthes e reform s ,s u ch as the kolkhoz m arkets ,b ecam e p erm anent.
At the s am e tim e,attem p ts w ere m ade to reform indu s trialp lanning. Early ex p eriences q u ickly conv inced Sergo Ordz honikidz e,the chiefof Ves enkha (the indu s trialm inis try ofthe tim e),that detailed inter-p lant trans actions s hou ld b e decentraliz ed.By 1 9 3 1 he had b ecom e a keen adv ocate ofcos t accou nting and the idea that,ifp laced u nder s tricter financialdis cip line,indu s trialenterp ris es cou ld b e relied on to m ake contracts for m aterials u p p lies in a decentraliz ed w ay ,w ithou t gu idance from a centralp lan (Vol4 :1 2).
This idea b ecam e a p roject that Orz honikidz e s hared w ith his s u b ordinates ,s om e ofw hom w ent fu rther,adv ocating the lib eraliz ation of credit and p rices .I t w as ev entu ally b locked,how ev er,b y Stalin and M olotov ,w ho cons idered q u antitativ e controls ofou tp u ts and inp u ts to b e the only reliab le w ay to get des ired res u lts .M oreov er,Ordz honikidz e's ow n ex p erim entation ap p eared to p rov e them right.At the end of1 9 3 2 Ordz honikidz e u nex p ectedly cancelled centraliz ed eq u ip m ent s u p p ly p lans for the iron,s teel,coal,and oilindu s tries for 1 93 3 .The b u y ers and s el lers ofthe eq u ip m ent w ere ins tru cted to contract w ith each other indep endently ofthe p lan.The b u y ers ,dis b eliev ing that they w ou ld b e held to accou nt for financiallos s es ,tried to p lace orders that w ere v as tly inflated.The s ellers ,w ho w ere crim inally liab le ifthey refu s ed an order, did not know w hom to refu s e.T he m arket w as froz en b y indecis ion and m is tru s t (Vol.4 :269).Stil lcom m itted to a reform ,Ordz honikidz e tu rned the p rob lem ov er to a conference ofindu s try rep res entativ es in M os cow . I n the s p ring of1 93 3 ,the Politb u ro s tep p ed in,ordering the dis m is s alof the m ore radicalreform is ts .Ordz honikidz e w as is olated and hu m iliated.
Giv en their ob jectiv es ,Stalin and M olotov m ade the right choice.They aim ed for a highly m ob iliz ed econom y ,ab le to deliv er s u rp lu s res ou rces for econom ic and m ilitary cap acity -b u ilding.I fthat w as the p rim ary goal, it did not m ake s ens e to giv e b road dis cretion ov er detailed im p lem entation to m iddle m anagers ,let alone to cons u m ers .For thes e w ou ld only u s e their controlofday -to-day trans actions to div ert res ou rces aw ay from the gov ernm ent's ' one b as ic ob jectiv e'(to u s e Lange's p hras e) to ' non-es s ential'u s es .
I n the m id-1 93 0 s there w as s om e s oftening ofthe Sov iet econom ic s y s tem .After the w ors t ofthe fam ine,food p rodu cts w ere taken offthe ration (Vol.6:1 21 -1 29 ,1 7 3 -1 7 6).T here w ere attem p ts at financial reform (Vol.6:24 8 -25 2) and a m ore conciliatory ap p roach to ' elem ents ' form erly regarded as hos tile,s u ch as form er ku laks and their children (Vol.6:28 2-28 4 ).Bu t no fu rther s u b s tantialm ov es w ere m ade tow ards econom ic decentraliz ation b efore the w ar.
I n the p res ent v olu m e,cons idering the late 1 9 3 0 s ,w e des crib e conditions that w ere p erhap s u niq u ely u nfav ou rab le to the cons ideration offu rther reform s :a hu nt for traitors ,w ides p read arres ts and ex ecu tions am ongs t the p arty elite,and m as s killings and m as s incarcerations in s ociety as a w hole.A s eries ofm eas u res increas ed the centralis ation of the econom y :the ex p anding s cop e offorced lab ou r (Chap ters 4 ,6,and 9), the grow ing p res s u re on the p eas antry and the p riv ate s ector (Chap ter 7 ), and the hars her regim entation ofw aged non-agricu ltu ralem p loy m ent (Chap ter 8 ).Other changes in the s y s tem at this tim e w ere als o des igned to p rotect the au thority ofthe centre as the econom y ex p anded and its s u p p ly chains b ecam e increas ingly com p lex .T hes e inclu ded b reaking u p the em p ires ofthe indu s trialcom m is s ariats and giv ing Gos p lan m ore au thority to coordinate the s u p p ly chains that linked them (Chap ter 2).
W as the Sov iet econom y reform ab le? At its m os t general,this q u es tion cannot b e ans w ered on the ev idence ofthe Sov iet Union in the 1 93 0 s .T he ex am p les ofRu s s ia,China,Vietnam ,N orth Korea,and Cu b a s ince the 1 95 0 s s how m any trans itions aw ay from econom ic ins titu tions ofthe Sov iet ty p e.The Sov iet ex p erience ofthe 1 9 3 0s does s how u s tw o things . Firs t,the p os tw ar s talem ate ofreform ers v ers u s cons erv ativ es w as rooted in the s y s tem from its firs t y ears .I t is w rong to s u p p os e that p res s u re for econom ic reform s b egan only w hen reform is t op inions firs t fou nd a p u b lic v oice in the 1 95 0s .Su ch p res s u res ap p eared alm os t as s oon as the com m and s y s tem w as ins titu ted,and they w ere felt at ev ery lev elofthe s y s tem from b ottom to top ,althou gh they rem ained s ecret for the tim e b eing.Second,the s tal em ate w ou ld not b e res olv ed w hile Sov iet leaders w ere com m itted to u p hold the p arty 's ab s olu te m onop oly of p ow er.The Sov iet econom y w as certainly not reform ab le w hile Stalin liv ed,and the reas on is that Stalin and M olotov im m ediately headed off any and allattem p ts at reform .I n other w ords ,w henev er the top leaders w ere offered the chance to trade a littl e p ow er for m ore p rodu ctiv ity or m ore efficiency in the econom y ,they chos e p ow er.
(F)T hena tur eofS ovi eteconom i cdevel opm ent
One ofthe chiefclaim s ofStalin and other Sov iet leaders for their right to p res ide ov er an au thoritarian s y s tem w as that the s y s tem they had b u ilt gav e s u p erior ou tcom es for p eacefu leconom ic and s ocialdev elop m ent,as in tim e ofw ar (Stalin 1 997 ,1 5:1 69;1 6:1 0-1 1 ).
W hat is econom ic dev elop m ent? Econom ic dev elop m ent has m any dim ens ions .M os t com m only acknow ledged hav e b een the v ariou s as p ects of' s tru ctu ralchange'-the w idening ofm arkets ,the div is ion oflab ou r and s p ecialis ation,the div ers ification ofp rodu ction from agricu ltu re to indu s trialis ation and the em ergence ofm odern s erv ices ,the ris e oftow ns , the m ov em ent ofw orkers into factories and offices ,the increas e ofliv ing s tandards and longev ity ,the trans ition to a low -m ortality ,low -fertility s ociety inclu ding the adv ancem ent ofw om en and the p rotection of children,the creation ofa s kil led and literate w orkforce throu gh edu cation and training,the ris e ofentrep reneu rs and corp orations that s p ons or s y s tem atic p rodu ctiv ity grow th b y linking s cience to p rodu ction, and the trading and b orrow ing ofgoods ,s erv ices ,ideas ,and cu ltu res acros s the w orld.W hile al lthes e as p ects are logical ly connected, econom is ts and econom ic his torians hav e fou nd m any v aried p atterns in their ordering and rates ofchange acros s cou ntries and ov er tim e (Gers chenkron 1 962;Ku z nets 1 97 1 ).
Du ring the Cold W ar,the dis cip line ofeconom ics as it w as p ractis ed in the W es t gav e ris e to s ev eralnew fields ,inclu ding dev elop m ent econom ics ,the s tu dy ofSov iet-ty p e econom ies as a s p ecialis m in its ow n right,and ' com p arativ e econom ics '-the com p aris on ofallty p es of econom ic s y s tem ,inclu ding cap italis m and s ocialis m .The econom ic his tory ofthe Sov iet Union w as a u nify ing thread,b inding thes e fields together.The s cholars inv olv ed gav e m u ch attention to the adv antages and lim itations ofv ariou s his toricalp aths ofeconom ic dev elop m ent, inclu ding that ofthe Sov iet Union.T hey often des crib ed Sov iet econom ic p olicies as one p os s ib le ' s trategy for grow th'or ' m odelofdev elop m ent. ' (N ov e 1 9 64 ;Sp u lb er 1 9 64 ;W ilb er 1 967 ).I t w as com m on to engage in s om e form ofcos t-b enefit analy s is .The Sov iet p attern ofeconom ic dev elop m ent w as held to confer b enefits ,s u ch as accelerated indu s trialis ation and the b u ilding ofinfras tru ctu ralcap ital.T here w ere als o cos ts ,s u ch as inefficiencies and form s ofw as tage as s ociated w ith the heav y hand ofau thoritarian ru le.Am ong thes e w ere the des tru ction of raw lab ou r and hu m an cap italb y m as s killing and their m is allocation b y m as s im p ris onm ent and negativ e s election,althou gh orders ofm agnitu de w ere u nknow n and u nknow ab le at that tim e.W hether the cos ts w ere av oidab le and w hether the achiev em ents cou ld b e thou ght ofas w orthw hile w ere deb ated.
The m ob ilis ed character ofSov iet s ociety w as one factor that gav e the Sov iet p attern ofeconom ic dev elop m ent u ndeniab le ap p ealam ong contem p orary ob s erv ers .I n the 1 93 0 s ,the Sov iet m ob ilis ation for lab ou r s u gges ted a contras t to the conditions ofdep res s ion and w ides p read u nem p loy m ent in the m u ch w ealthier m arket econom ies ofW es tern Eu rop e and N orth Am erica.I n the 1 9 4 0s ,the Sov iet m ob ilis ation for w ar ins p ired adm iration for the u nex p ected res ilience s how n in the face of ov erw helm ing m ilitary attack and a cru elw ar ofannihilation.I n the 1 95 0 s ,the Sov iet m ob ilis ation for p os tw ar recons tru ction and the Cold W ar s u gges ted a m odelto the new leaders ofm u ch p oorer cou ntries ,s u ch as China and I ndia,w ho w is hed to b u ild nationalidentity and national cap ab ilities after m ilitary occu p ation or colonialru le.
H ow s hou ld w e ev alu ate the Sov iet p attern ofeconom ic dev elop m ent? The record ofthe Sov iet econom y ofthe 1 93 0 s s how s p lenty ofs tru ctu ral change.T his ev idence is s tronger in s om e as p ects than in others .M os t ob v iou s w as the ris e ofm odern indu s tries and cities .Linked to thes e w ere other s tru ctu ralchanges ,s u ch as a p has e ofthe Sov iet dem ograp hic trans ition (des crib ed in Chap ter 5).The p os ition ofw om en in s ociety als o changed radically .As m il lions ofnew job s w ere created in factories and offices ,and as thou s ands ofnew s chools and colleges rais ed their literacy and nu m eracy ,m ill ions ofy ou ng w om en w ere b eneficiaries .From the b eginning ofSov iet ru le,the Bols hev iks s aw a w as ted as s et in Ru s s ia's illiterate w om en and w orked to retriev e their efforts and talents throu gh literacy cam p aigns and edu cation.I n 1 9 26,5 7 p er cent ofSov iet w om en aged 9 to 4 9 cou ld not read or w rite;b y 1 93 9 that p rop ortion had fallen to 1 8 p er cent (the com p arab le rates for m en w ere 28 and 6 p er cent) (N a rod noe khozya istvo1 97 2:3 5 ).Untilthis tim e,Ru s s ian w om en of hu m b le origin generally had no b etter op tions than dru dgery in the hou s ehold or the field or factory .I lliteracy trap p ed them in thes e roles . W ith m as s s chool ing,w om en cou ld as p ire to s kil led w ork and to v ocationaland p rofes s ionalem p loy m ent.T he indu s trialis ation ofthe Sov iet econom y created thes e roles in v as t nu m b ers .By 1 94 0 ,w om en m ade the m ajority ofem p loy ees in health,edu cation,and cu ltu re,and one third ofem p loy ees in gov ernm ent adm inis tration (N a rod noe khozya istvo 1 97 2:3 4 8 ).I t is tru e that a glas s ceiling continu ed to res trict w om en's p rom otion,and the u rb an fam ily m aintained the traditionaldiv is ion of dom es tic lab ou r b etw een the s ex es fou nd in the cou ntry s ide.Still,m any w om en ex p erienced a dram atic w idening ofop p ortu nities .
The y ou ng w om en w ho b enefited s o m u ch from acces s to edu cation and office w ork als o fou nd they had m u ch to los e.The s tate that p rov ided their edu cation and em p loy m ent dem anded ab s olu te loy alty in retu rn. The s am e s tate not infreq u ently rew arded that loy al ty b y b reaking careers ,friends hip s ,and fam ily b onds ,im p ris oning and killing lov ed ones and,as often as not,their fam ily m em b ers (a fictionalaccou nt is the s tory ofSofia Petrov na b y Chu kov s kay a 1 9 67 ).
W hile op p ortu nities w ere w idened for m any ,for m any others they narrow ed or b ecam e entirely clos ed.As m il lions ofy ou ng p eop le m ov ed u p w ard tow ards the light,they w ere p as s ed in the op p os ite direction b y s ignificant nu m b ers oftheir ow n cohorts ,as w el las ofolder and y ou ng p eop le w ho,hav ing b egu n to ris e,and m eeting w ith s om e p oliticalor s ocialdifficu lty ,w ere cau ght u p in one ofthe p eriodic fam ines or m as s op erations and w ere throw n b ack dow n into darknes s .Thu s ,from farm to factory and office w as not the only direction ofm ov em ent in s ociety . There w as a cou nter-m ov em ent from farm s ,factories ,and offices to res ettlem ent,to the lab ou r cam p ,and to the m as s grav e.
I n the ou tcom e,the Sov iet s ociety ofthe 1 93 0 s s how s a p aradox .As new job s w ere created in factories and offices ,and as new s chools and colleges rais ed their literacy and nu m eracy ,m illions ex p erienced a w idening ofop p ortu nities .Bu t this w as b rou ght ab ou t w ithou t their agency ;it w as done to them b y a coerciv e s tate in the nam e ofa p arty that cas t dow n as m any as it rais ed u p ,w hile deny ing nearly allofthem any s ignificant v oice in the p roces s .
For J os ep h Schu m p eter (1 93 4 ) the agent ofeconom ic dev elop m ent w as the entrep reneu r,w ithou t w hom there w as no innov ation.(Sen 1 999 ex tends this idea to the relations hip ofeconom ic dev elop m ent to hu m an agency in a m ore generals ens e. ) I n this as p ect the Sov iet econom y ofthe 1 93 0 s s u gges ts b ackw ard m ov em ent.Collectiv is ation redu ced m illions of indep endent farm ers to s erv ants ofthe collectiv e (Vols 1 and 2).As things tu rned ou t,the Sov iet s tate cou ld not m anage agricu ltu re and u rb an food s u p p lies w ithou t leav ing a role for decentralis ed hou s ehold econom ic activ ities (Vol.5 ).W ithin the p eriod ofthe p res ent v olu m e,as w e hav e s een (Chap ter 7 ),the s tate acted rep eatedly to res trict their s cop e and p enalis e their s u cces s es .I n Sov iet indu s try ,cons tru ction,trans p ort,and dis trib u tion,entrep reneu rialfu nctions w ere res erv ed entirely for the clos ed circle ofp arty leaders w ho determ ined the p lan and the p arty directiv es that im p lem ented and s u p p lem ented the p lan;no one cou ld s tart u p a new p roject or v entu re w ithou t their ap p rov al.
Schu m p eter as s ociated innov ation w ith indep endent entrep reneu rs hip .The Sov iet econom y ofthe 1 93 0 s s how ed that centralis ed p olicy initiativ es cou ld force new p rodu cts and p roces s es in lim ited fields s u ch as m achine b u ilding and the defence indu s try .Bu t centralis ed decis ion-m aking als o m ade m is takes for w hich there w as no m arket-econom y correctiv e,s u ch as in the s election ofagricu ltu rals eed v arieties (Chap ter 7 ).As for the incentiv es faced b y Sov iet m anagers in their daily rou tines ,thes e either dis cou raged innov ation or channelled it into the s im u lated im p rov em ent ofthe p rodu ction p rofile (s ee Section (B) ab ov e).Thu s ,the econom ic s y s tem failed to fos ter innov ation.At the s am e tim e Sov iet s ociety w as delib erately clos ed offfrom the fertilis ing influ ence offoreign ideas and ex am p les ,ex cep t to b u y W es tern technologies and des igns w hen term s w ere accep tab le and s tealthem otherw is e.The Ru s s ian dem ograp her AnatoliiVis hnev s kii(20 1 0 ) has characteriz ed the ou tcom e as ' cons erv ativ e'm odernis ation -a s ty le of econom ic dev elop m ent that aim ed firs t to cop y and then to riv althe W es t, b u t that lacked the cap ab ility to s u cceed (s ee als o Ellm an 20 1 4 :3 63 -3 65 ).
Under Stalin's ru le,Sov iet Ru s s ia m ade a giant leap tow ards indu s trialis ation.T he radicalis m and s w eep ofthe econom ic p olicies that b rou ght indu s trialis ation ab ou t dis trib u ted large gains and large los s es am ongs t the p op u lation.I t is a m is take,how ev er,to think that thes e gains and los s es w ere the p oint -to s u p p os e that the p rim ary goalofSov iet econom ic p olicies w as to p rom ote the w elfare ofs om e grou p s in s ociety or to ens erfor ex term inate others .The changes ofthis natu re that cam e ab ou t w ere ty p ically im p rov is ed in s u p p ort ofa greater goal.T he greater goalw as to b u ild the m ilitary and indu s trialcap ab ilities ofthe Sov iet s tate,m aking it s ecu re and p ow erfu lat hom e and ab road.T his w as the ob jectiv e that Stalin and his colleagu es p u rs u ed at allcos ts .W hile doing s o,they m ade m any m is calcu l ations .Ev ery m is take dis trib u ted additional los s es acros s s ociety ,and the los s es w ere m agnified b y Stalin's relu ctance to recogniz e or adap t his p olicies to them .Des p ite this ,hinds ight leav es u s w ith a m eas u re ofs u cces s :b y 1 9 3 9 Stalin had b u ilt an econom y ab le to s u p p ly enou gh ofthe m eans ofnationalp ow er that the Sov iet s tate w ou ld s u rv iv e the com ing w ar and b e in p os ition to com p ete for glob alinflu ence in the decades that follow ed. (1 9 93 :1 1 8 ), w ho giv e totals for J anu ary 1 each y ear,here conv erted to m id-y ear;the figu re for 1 9 3 9 is b as ed on the J anu ary 1 figu re ex trap olated to m id-y ear b as ed on the p op u lation m ov em ent from 1 93 9 to 1 94 0 w ithin p os tw ar frontiers .GDP for 1 928 to 1 93 9 is from M oors teen and Pow ell (1 966: 623 ) ,ex trap olated b ack to 1 91 3 on the b as is offigu res for 1 91 3 and 1 9 28 giv en b y M arkev ich and H arris on (20 1 1 :67 2-7 0 3 ).Finally ,GDP p er head is GDP div ided b y p op u lation.
T A BL ES

Ta b le 2.The Sovie te c onom y,1940 c om pa re d with 1937 :Sovie tof f ic ia la nd w e ste rne stim a te s(pe rc e ntof1937 )
A Sov iet official m eas u re A W es tern es tim ate At cu rrent p rices : N ationalincom e 1 5 1 % 1 5 5 % At fix ed p rices : N ationalincom e 1 3 3 % 1 1 8 -1 21 % I ndu s trial p rodu ction 1 4 5 % 1 1 9% M u nitions ou tp u t 28 3 % 27 2-28 2% Sou rces .N ationalincom e:net m aterialp rodu ct in cu rrent p rices and in p lan p rices of1 9 26/27 from Vol.7 ,T ab le J -1 ;gros s nationalp rodu ct at cu rrent p rices and factor cos ts of1 9 3 7 from Vol.7 ,T ab le J -2,the u p p er lim it b eing taken from Bergs on and the low er lim it from M oors teen and Pow el l.I ndu s trialp rodu ction,from Vol.7 ,Tab le J -4 .M u nitions ou tp u t: Vol.7 ,T ab le J-5,the u p p er lim it b eing taken from M oors teen and Pow ell (1 966) and the low er lim it from Dav ies and H arris on (1 9 97 (1 94 5 (20 1 7 ).
